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The ETF Thematic Investor: Asia Tech - Capital Follows Policy

The latest note from “The ETF Thematic Investor” series captures a key shift across Asia: governments are increasingly treating compute and data infrastructure as strategic assets. Read more.
11 August 2026

    Summary

    • Capital follows policy: When technology becomes strategically important, Asian governments have a strong record of building capabilities, coordinating industry and attracting private capital into supply-chains.
    • AI sovereignty is the catalyst: Governments increasingly want greater control over compute infrastructure, directing support towards chips, memory, data centres, cybersecurity to power and cooling.
    • The state plays a larger role in Asia: Across China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, state-linked sources account for around 32 per cent of the AI ecosystem funding identified, compared to 2 per cent in US and 25 per cent in Europe.
    • Key takeaway: Follow where policy, private capital and real demand converge, whilst watching overcapacity and geopolitics.
    Computing power is national power

    Towards the end of 2025, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te opened a new national cloud computing centre in Tainan City, with the above phrase. The quote captures succinctly where technology policy is heading.

    In our first issue of “The ETF Thematic Investor” series, we looked at Asia tech through the lens of three waves: the post-dotcom internet build-out, the smartphone and mobile internet era, and now the AI infrastructure era. Our conclusion was that tech adoption looks like zeros and ones (digital) but it typically requires a significant physical base supporting it.

    With the AI boom, this becomes even more evident. For example, the visible product might be a model, chatbot or app but there exists a hidden infrastructure layer of compute, chips, memory, data centres and clouds, power, cooling and connectivity.

    Governments have always cared about the infrastructure that shapes economic power. Throughout history, this meant railways, ports, power grids, telecom networks to defense capacity and energy supply. Later, semiconductors joined the list too. In our contemporary AI era, compute and data infrastructure is shifting towards the same sphere.

    For investors, the question goes beyond “who has the best model?” or “who has the best app”. It’s about where the infrastructure gets built, who funds it, who controls it, and which nations treat it as important enough to support. This note highlights how Asian policy is now steering capital into the AI build-out.

    Policy capital has built Asia tech before

    The connection between policy and tech is not new in Asia. Semis are a good example in this. For example, Taiwan didn’t become a world leader in building foundries by accident. Its chip industry was built with heavy state support. In the 1970s, a government-backed research institute bought in overseas chipmaking tech, trained engineers abroad and translated this know-how into a domestic semis industry.

    South Korea took a slightly different route. In the 1980s, the government worked closely with large industrial groups and research institutes, using public R&D to move from labour-intensive exports and simple chip assembly to memory-chip expertise. This helped shape Korea’s leadership in memory as it’s known for today.

    Japan had its own flavour of this approach. In the 1970s, the government collaborated with companies and research groups, using public R&D and industrial coordination to build expertise in advanced chipmaking. This aided Japan to become a major force in semis, electronics and the equipment and materials required for making chips. See Chart 1 – How strategic tech become investible industries for an overview of how historic state policies took tech from a strategic need to supporting the build-out of industries, in our five-phased Asia Tech Policy Framework.

    More recently, China has been using a similar policy playbook. Through their five-year plans, chip-sector policies, tax support and state-backed semis funds, China has been building out more domestic capabilities in chips, chipmaking tools, software and advanced manufacturing. China’s third “Big Fund”, the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, was registered in 2024 with around USD47.5bn

    Even though every government policy won’t have worked exactly as intended in our illustrations; the commonality is clear. When a tech becomes strategically key, Asian governments have helped build skills, companies and draw capital into the supply-chains around it. This happened with semis. We are beginning to see it happen again as governments treat compute, data centres and the infrastructure needed to run AI as strategic infrastructure.

    Chart 1: Asia Tech Policy Framework

    How strategic tech became investible industries (eg. semis)

    Chart 1: Asia Tech Policy Framework

    Click the image to enlarge

    AI sovereignty is the new reason for policy capital

    As governments lean into AI, it’s likely to become embedded in how are economies run. Financial services, factories, hospitals, logistics, public services and consumer services could all become dependent on AI, which makes control of the underlying infrastructure a strategic concern.

    That’s the practical idea behind “AI sovereignty”. Countries want greater control over the inputs needed to build and deploy AI, especially compute and the models that run on it. This particularly matters in Asia because the region sits at the centre of the physical AI supply chain (Taiwan in foundries, South Korea in memory, Japan in materials and manufacturing equipment).

    But supply-chain strength doesn’t necessarily imply full independence. Taiwan, South Korea and Japan still rely on global customers, foreign chip designers, advanced tools and imported energy. China’s situation is different, it has strong AI ambitions but is trying to reduce reliance on foreign hardware and software, namely GPUs, chipmaking tools, electronic design automation software and parts of the global software ecosystem.

    Hence, AI sovereignty gives governments a rationale to support the parts of the tech stack they view as strategically important: from chips and memory, semiconductor equipment, data centres and cloud, cybersecurity, to the power and cooling required to keep it all running. For investors, policy highlights where capital may keep flowing; China’s hard-tech may still be discounted due to export controls and geopolitics, but those same pressures also drive domestic capability-building. The key question is whether markets are too cautious about areas that remain high on the policy agenda.

    Chart 2: Asia Tech Policy Framework

    How governments are supporting build-out of modern AI industries

    Chart 2: Asia Tech Policy Framework

    Click the image to enlarge

    China looking for its next growth engines

    If one looks globally, China is perhaps the clearest example of policy and tech coming together. The old growth model needs change. Property is no longer the same engine it was, traditional infrastructure has less room for upside surprise than in the early part of the 21st century, and low-cost manufacturing is unlikely to be sufficient for the coming decade.

    This is the backdrop for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. This plan targets at least 7 per cent annual growth in R&D spend, wants core digital economy industries to reach 12.5 per cent of GDP, and proposes 109 major projects across areas such as new quality productive forces and modern infrastructure. Its priority sectors include integrated circuits, AI, robotics, quantum tech, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), 6G, new energy, new materials and advanced manufacturing.

    AI sits directly inside this shift. China wants AI to be useful across factories, logistics networks, hospitals and schools to consumer platforms. Naturally, this makes cost and access to compute important. The DeepSeek moment in 2025 is a useful example. DeepSeek was private-sector led, but its low-cost, open-source approach arrived at the right moment for China’s policy agenda. The recent debate around Moonshot AI’s Kimi models point in the same direction.

    However, China has not escaped the need for compute. Strong demand shows compute remains scarce and valuable. But China’s AI path may put more focus on cheaper deployment, open models and practical user cases than a pure competition on who spends the most on frontier models. This path won’t be smooth, but the direction is clear, China is trying to guide more capital towards technologies it sees as essential for the next stage of growth. See Chart 2 – How governments are supporting build-out of modern AI industries above to see how we identified Asian governments have been using policy to support the build of out AI industries through our Asia Tech Policy Framework.

    Demographics make automation a macro necessity

    Policy is one part of the Asia tech story. Demographics is another. The pressure is clearest in North Asia. Japan has about 29 per cent of its population aged 65 or over, Taiwan crossed 20 per cent in 2025, which makes it a super-aged society, and South Korea faces one of the sharpest projected falls in working-age population within OECD economies.

    That accelerates the role of AI, related automation and robotics. In ageing economies, these are not just simply future tech but become practical tools to foster growth when labour is scarce. Factories will need more automation, healthcare needs more digital support, and logistics and services need software that can reduce repetitive work.

    From an investors point of view automation isn’t simply about replacing labour, it’s about making scarce labour more productive. This gives AI, robotics and industrial software a stronger macro reason to grow.

    Chart 3: Who’s funding the AI build-out?

    Estimated regional funding mix highlights greater state backing in Asia

    Chart 3: Who’s funding the AI build-out?

    Click the image to enlarge

    AI needs power before it needs more apps

    The AI build-out has a physical constraint, it required far more electricity. The International Energy Agency estimates that data centres globally used around 415 TWh of power in 2024. By 2030, that could rise to around 945 TWh. This places grids, transformers, switchgear, backup power, cooling systems and long-term power contracts into the AI discussion.

    For Asia, this is close to home. Data centre capacity is expanding across the region. Industry real-estate consultant Cushman & Wakefield estimate that Asia-Pacific data centre capacity reached 13.8GW in 2025, with a development pipeline of 19.4GW.

    Asia is also exposed to the supply-chain that powers and cools this infrastructure. For example, China is key to solar panels and batteries. Taiwan has depth in power electronics, power supplies and cooling systems. Japan and South Korea have industrial exposure to cables, transformers, high-voltage systems, switchgear and precision components. For investors, the key point is that AI infrastructure goes beyond chips and servers and Asia has its role to play.

    The ETF thematic investor takeaway: Policy capital is building Asia’s next tech wave

    The policy sentiment and capital backdrop for Asia tech remains supportive. Across the four AI-focused Asian markets (China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) covered in Chart 3 – Who’s funding the AI build-out?, government and state-linked institutions accounted for about 32 per cent of the AI ecosystem funding. This contrasts with roughly 2 per cent in the US and 25 per cent in Europe. The takeaway from the chart is that the state plays a much larger role in directing and underwriting Asia’s AI build-out.

    The reason do differ by country. China is looking for new sources of growth engines beyond property and traditional infrastructure, whilst also looking to reduce its dependence on foreign tech. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are responding to ageing workforces and labour shortage, whilst also building on established strengths in semis, memory and manufacturing equipment. In all cases, AI policy is tied to a wider economic and industrial goal.

    For investors, the opportunity extends well beyond the most visible models and applications. AI requires a much larger physical base, from foundries to cooling and connectivity. Asia already occupies important parts of this supply-chain, and policy support can help extend the investment cycle, build domestic capability and attract private capital alongside the state.

    However, this doesn’t mean that every company exposed to these themes will gain. History has also shown us that public support can create overcapacity, competition can pressure margins, and export controls and geopolitics can remain a risk factor. Investors still need to distinguish between policy ambition and capital turning into orders, revenues and earnings. Tech leadership, balance-sheet capability, customer demand and pricing power will remain crucial going forwards.

    The broader conclusion is that Asia’s next phase is likely to be shaped by as much by infrastructure and industrial capability as by the next successful app. For thematic investors, the aim is identifying companies positioned in parts of the value chain where policy priorities, private investments and real demand begin to reinforce one another.

    Source: HSBC Asset Management, July 2026.

    This information should not be construed as a recommendation to invest in the specific country, product, strategy, sector or security. The views expressed above were held at the time of preparation and are subject to change without notice. Any forecast, projection or target where provided is indicative only and is not guaranteed in any way. HSBC Asset Management accepts no liability for any failure to meet such forecast, projection or target.

    Source: HSBC Asset Management, July 2026. CICC 2026, Reuters 2025, Byline 2025, AWS 2025, GMI 2025, ASE 2025, Taipei City Government 2025, UDN 2025, Taipei Times 2024, Kantei 2024, EY Taiwan 2023

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